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Abstract For the traditional legalistic discourse on the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), “politics” is a bête noire that compromises the independence of the 
Court and thus needs to be avoided and overcome. In response to this legalistic 
approach, a burgeoning body of literature insists that the Court does not exist and 
operate “beyond politics”, arguing that the ICC is an institution where law and poli-
tics are intimately connected. The present article seeks to contribute to this “non-
traditional” literature by addressing two of its fundamental weaknesses: First, writ-
ers of the “non-traditional camp” often present a rather limited view of “politics”; in 
particular, they have shied away from taking the radical step of portraying and ana-
lysing the ICC as a “political actor”. This undermines both its critical and construc-
tive potential. Secondly, these commentators offer a simplistic explanation as to why 
“traditionalists” treat politics as the ICC’s bête noire: Traditionalists, they claim, are 
“legalists” with scant interest in and understanding of politics. By focusing on the 
ICC’s nature as a political actor, this article does not only paint a more nuanced pic-
ture of the ICC but also demonstrates the constructive potential of this understand-
ing of the ICC to shed light on the so-called “peace versus justice dilemma”. And 
secondly, it demonstrates that precisely because the ICC is and ought to be a pru-
dent political actor, it must officially disavow politics. The “noble lie” of disavowing 
politics, therefore, is a prudential strategy to avoid dangerous moral and political 
consequences and, ultimately, to secure the continued existence of the ICC itself.
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1 Introduction
Many advocates of international criminal justice have gone to great lengths to por-
tray the International Criminal Court (ICC) as an apolitical—even anti-political—
institution. International lawyers, for example, who have traditionally dominated the 
discussion on humankind’s first permanent ICC, tend to portray it as a strictly legal 
institution and to study it from an exclusively legal perspective. The view that the 
ICC is and must be isolated from politics has also been expressed by the Court’s 
prosecutors who are anxious to paint a picture of the Court as an unyielding pur-
suer of legal justice that is completely detached from politics. This “traditional 
approach”1 has created a legalistic narrative in which politics is portrayed as the 
ICC’s bête noire.
In response to this legalistic approach, a burgeoning body of literature on inter-
national criminal justice has begun to emerge, which insists that the ICC cannot be 
adequately understood from an exclusively legal perspective. The gist of this litera-
ture’s arguments is that the Court does not exist and operate “beyond politics” since 
the ICC is an institution where law and politics are intimately connected. While I am 
sympathetic to this non-traditional camp, I also believe that this body of literature 
suffers from two serious weaknesses: first, these writers often present a rather lim-
ited view of “politics” or the political”; in particular, they have shied away from tak-
ing the radical step of portraying and analyzing the ICC as a “political actor.” This, 
I contend, undermines the critical and constructive potential of the non-traditional 
camp. Second, these commentators tend to offer a rather simplistic explanation as to 
why “traditionalists” treat politics as the ICC’s bête noire: traditionalists, they claim, 
are “legalists” with scant interest in and understanding of politics. I propose, how-
ever, that there might be a much more sophisticated strategy behind the official disa-
vowal of politics: disavowing politics and portraying the ICC as an unyielding pur-
suer of legal justice might well be a prudential strategy to avoid devastating moral 
and political consequences. This strategy is what I will call the “noble lie.”2
This article, then, represents an attempt to address both weaknesses of the non-
traditional camp. After having sketched the traditionalists’ view of politics as the 
ICC’s bête noire in the first section, it sets out to develop the idea of the ICC as a 
political actor. This idea, I suggest, has two dimensions: first, the ICC has a political 
interest in combatting its own enemies, whom it stigmatizes as “enemies of all man-
kind.” As such, the Court cannot escape what Carl Schmitt has famously called “the 
political”—the distinction between “friend” and “enemy.” Simultaneously, the ICC 
is engaged in a broader political struggle against mass atrocities. From this perspec-
tive, the Court’s interventions must pursue the ultimate purpose of creating a world 
1 I employ the term “traditionalists” to describe the group of scholars who portray politics as the ICC’s 
“bête noire.” While it should be clear that the categories of “traditionalists” and “non-traditionalists” are 
ideal-types, this distinction is, I believe, a useful way of approaching the complex question of the rela-
tionship between law and politics in international criminal justice.
2 I understand the term “noble lie” as the strategic creation and repetition of a lie in order to avoid dan-
gerous moral and political consequences.
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in which the evil of mass atrocities rears its ugly head less frequently. Subsequently, 
I demonstrate the constructive potential of this idea by analyzing the relationship 
between the two dimensions: by bringing the discussion—which is usually framed 
as a metaphysical struggle between “peace” and “justice”—back to the realm of 
concrete political consequences and political interests, I demonstrate that the two 
dimensions are in a more harmonious relationship than might be assumed and, con-
sequently, that the underlying problem of the “peace versus justice dilemma” is less 
intractable than often claimed.
In the final section, I turn to the question of why Court officials disavow politics 
and develop the argument that it is vital that they continue to do so. I suggest that 
portraying politics as a bête noire can be understood as a noble lie to avoid what I 
shall call “perverse incentives.” The argument is that if the Court’s officials acknowl-
edged that they are guided by pragmatic political considerations, in particular by 
considerations as to whether ICC interventions prolong or exacerbate bloody con-
flicts, it would become all too easy for the perpetrators of mass atrocities to evade 
prosecution simply by threatening to commit further crimes. Paradoxically, then, the 
threat of prosecution could create “perverse incentives” to commit atrocities, and the 
only strategy to avoid this trap is to cultivate the noble lie of an inherently apolitical 
Court.
The main purpose of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of the 
ICC by bringing into clearer focus some of the vexed conundrums the Court faces, 
and the role it can and should play in world politics. My central argument is that the 
ICC must act as a prudent political actor on the one hand, but must uphold the noble 
lie of a strictly apolitical Court on the other.3 In other words, precisely because the 
ICC is and ought to be a political actor, it must disavow politics. The noble lie, there-
fore, is a prudential strategy to avoid dangerous moral and political consequences 
and, ultimately, to secure the continued existence of the ICC itself.
2  Politics as the ICC’s Bête Noire
When the ICC was established in 1998, advocates of international criminal justice 
were elated. Bassiouni (1999, 555), for example, asserted that the establishment of 
the ICC is “a triumph of all peoples of the world.” Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary-
General, presented the creation of the Court as the ultimate triumph of universal 
morality and the progressive march towards universal human rights and an interna-
tional rule of law (United Nations 1998a, b). And for Philippe Kirsch, the Chairman 
of the Committee of the Whole at the Rome Conference, the ICC represented noth-
ing less than “really the future of humanity” (United Nations 1998a).
3 Note, however, that the ICC is composed of a number of organs with different tasks (e.g., the Office of 
the Prosecutor, the Assembly of State Parties, the pre-trial chamber, the trial chamber, etc.). The argu-
ment that the ICC must “act politically,” which is developed in this article, is limited to the Office of 
the Prosecutor (and the prosecutor herself), since I do not go so far as to suggest that the ICC should act 
politically when adjudicating.
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For most proponents of international criminal justice, the creation of the ICC 
was a historical achievement primarily because they interpreted the creation of the 
Court as a major triumph of law over politics. At last, they argued, the international 
community had found a way to civilize states, to avoid the worst excesses of real-
politik, and to tame the pernicious consequences of unrestrained power politics. In 
other words, the legal prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of massive human 
rights abuses was presented as a crucial step towards a world in which the evil gen-
erated by politics rears its ugly head less frequently. Again, Bassiouni’s words at the 
Rome Conference are illustrative (1999, 555):
The ICC reminds states that realpolitik, which sacrifices justice at the altar 
of political settlement, is no longer accepted. It asserts that impunity for … 
perpetrators … is no longer tolerated. In that respect, it fulfils what Prophet 
Mohammed said, that “wrongs must be righted.” It affirms that justice is an 
integral part of peace and thus reflects what Pope Paul VI once said, “If you 
want peace, work for justice.” These values are clearly reflected in the ICC’s 
Preamble.
Hence, the message conveyed during the creation process of the ICC was unambigu-
ous: unrestrained politics has brought about the great catastrophes of the twentieth 
century and human suffering on an unimaginable scale; politics, therefore, must be 
tamed, restrained, and civilized. The most viable way to do so is through the crea-
tion of an impartial judicial body that prosecutes and punishes the world’s worst 
perpetrators. And precisely because the ICC has been constructed as a response to 
the evils of politics—indeed, the evil of politics—the Court must exist and operate 
strictly beyond politics. Politics, in short, was the bête noire during the ICC’s crea-
tion process.
The question, of course, is whether the ICC is still framed in these terms. Is the 
framework within which the ICC is portrayed, understood, and studied still based 
on this stark dichotomy of law and politics? The answer, at least if we focus on the 
dominant view expressed by Court officials and academics for the moment, is a clear 
“yes.” Academic studies of the ICC are dominated by international lawyers, who are 
anxious to stress the autonomy of the discipline of international law in general and 
the exclusively legal nature of the ICC in particular. Politics, international lawyers 
often argue, is the realm where power is scrupulously used to pursue narrow self-
interests; the “empire of law”—to use Dworkin’s (1998) term—however, is marked 
by fairness, the application of neutral rules, and Justitia’s legendary blindness, which 
guarantees objectivity of and equality before the law (Shaw 2014, 8). This legalistic 
mindset finds its clearest expression in the words of Hans-Peter Kaul, who insists 
(2010) that “The ICC must be detached from political or other inappropriate consid-
erations” and that “[i]t remains essential that the ICC continues to show—through 
the way it conducts all … activities—that it is a purely judicial, objective, neutral, 
and non-political institution.”4
4 For similar expressions of the legalistic mindset, see Bassiouni (2006) and Cassese (1999).
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This apolitical, even anti-political, discourse is by no means limited to the aca-
demic sphere. In fact, numerous officials of the ICC have taken the same line. The 
former president of the Court, Philipe Kirsch, faced with allegations of “politiciza-
tion” of the ICC, sought to fend off this critique by insisting that “there is not a shred 
of evidence … that the Court has done anything political. The Court is operating 
purely judicially” (Herman 2006). In a similar vein, the former Chief Prosecutor, 
Luis Moreno Ocampo, made his interpretation of the role of an international pros-
ecutor crystal clear (2010, 6): “I shall not be involved in political considerations. 
I have to respect scrupulously my legal limits … This is the only way to build a 
judicial institution … I apply the law without political considerations.” A particu-
larly interesting aspect of this statement is the prosecutor’s purported disregard for 
“political considerations”; Moreno Ocampo, it seems, was determined to interpret 
his role in strictly legal terms without considering the potential political (and moral) 
ramifications of his actions. What are the potential ramifications of the prosecu-
tor’s actions? The most serious of them is, of course, the effects the prosecution 
of perpetrators can have on ongoing conflicts. The problem—known as the “peace 
versus justice dilemma”—is that in some cases the prosecution of perpetrators can 
have profoundly negative effects on peace processes with the potential to exacer-
bate and prolong bloody conflicts (Kastner 2011; Kersten 2016; Krzan 2016). In a 
policy paper on the interpretation of Article 53 of the Rome Statute (1998)—the 
famous “interest of justice clause”—the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) addressed 
this “peace versus justice dilemma” by claiming that it is simply a “non-issue” for 
the prosecutor. Questions of peace and security, the policy paper argues, are inher-
ently “political”; consequently, these questions are not considered as legitimate 
reasons not to proceed with an investigation or prosecution under Article 53. “The 
broader matter of international peace and security,” the paper emphasizes, “is not 
the responsibility of the Prosecutor; it falls within the mandate of other institutions” 
(2007, 9).5 More recently, Moreno Ocampo’s successor, Fatou Bensouda, has reaf-
firmed this view (2012):
The Court and the Office of the Prosecutor itself are not involved in politi-
cal considerations. We have to respect our legal limits. The prospect of peace 
negotiations is therefore not a factor that forms part of the Office’s determina-
tion on the interests of justice. The international community has put in place 
some clear divisions of responsibility. The UN Security Council is in charge of 
peace and security. The ICC is doing justice.
Again, the message conveyed seems to be clear: the prosecutor, who, after all, 
“embodies in one person the ideas behind the ICC” (Minow et al. 2015, 360) is not 
interested in politics, not even in the political consequences of his or her actions. 
Justice must be done even if the world perishes because it is the prosecutor’s (and 
the ICC’s) only task to prosecute and punish those who have violated the law. Or, 
to put it in the words of the former president of the ICC, Judge Sang-Hyun Song, 
“accountability must prevail. Always and everywhere” (2012).
5 I.e., the UN Security Council.
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We can see, therefore, that academic commentators as well as officials of the 
Court try to develop a clear vision of the ICC: the ICC represents only the scales of 
justice and eschews the sword of politics. Law and politics are two fundamentally 
distinct realms, and it is the task of the Court to isolate itself completely from politi-
cal dynamics and political considerations. Justice at the international level is just as 
“blind” as it is at the domestic level; and if the ICC is to become a legitimate and 
effective judicial body, it must ensure that politics remains external to the Court. 
Politics, therefore, is still portrayed as the bête noire of the ICC.
3  The ICC as a “Political Actor”
While “traditionalists” frame the ICC as an apolitical, even anti-political, institu-
tion, more recently, a body of literature has emerged that refuses to accept the strict 
isolation of the ICC from politics. This non-traditional camp takes seriously the fact 
that the ICC exists in a “world of power politics” (Bosco 2014); consequently, these 
authors insist that international criminal justice must be “more than the unfolding of 
law’s master-plan” (Megret 2002, 1262). A strictly legalistic perspective is inappro-
priate, they assert, because the ICC does not operate from “some Archimedean point 
of nowhere devoid of politics and political interests” (Kersten 2016, 5), but rather 
“in the midst of politics and not detached from them” (Simpson 2007, 14). In sum, 
“politics is central to the court’s actions” (Hoover 2013, 281) and we can only begin 
to understand this institution if we accept that the ICC is shaped by the “conver-
gence of politics, ethics and law” (Roach 2006). The core of this burgeoning body of 
literature is that the ICC does not and cannot transcend politics; as such, it directly 
attacks the dominant view of the ICC as a strictly apolitical institution.
There is certainly a lot to be said for this open-minded, less legalistic approach 
to studying the ICC; these non-traditionalists almost by definition do not shy away 
from straddling different disciplines, most importantly, international criminal law, 
international relations and political theory. And yet, the critical and constructive 
potential of this scholarship is seriously undermined by its own weaknesses. One 
of these weaknesses is that these scholars often present a rather limited view of 
“politics” or “the political.” What they routinely refer to is that the ICC is a “politi-
cized Court” that cannot elude the political influence of internal or external actors 
(Köchler 2003; Roach 2006; Ainley 2011; Dana 2014; Tiemessen 2014, 2016). This, 
to be sure, is a vital aspect of the Court’s political nature; but there is another dimen-
sion of “politics” at play here, one that is even more controversial and less frequently 
discussed than “politicization”: this is the notion of the ICC as a “political actor.” 
For proponents of the non-traditionalist view, their own unwillingness to discuss the 
ICC as a political actor generates a serious problem: while they seek to develop a 
more realistic understanding of the Court’s role in world politics, their account of 
this role must remain extremely fuzzy as long as they refuse to take the nature of 
the ICC as a political actor seriously. The aim of this section, therefore, is, first, to 
develop a clearer vision of the Court’s role in world politics based on the argument 
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that the ICC is a political actor,6 and second, to demonstrate the constructive poten-
tial of this vision in shedding light on one of international criminal justice’s most 
complicated problems.
The argument that the ICC is a political actor rejects the idea of law as an autono-
mous realm detached from politics, and of the legal trial as something that takes 
place beyond political interests and goals; it strikes at the heart of the idea that the 
ICC intervenes as a “disinterested party” (Ralph 2007, 115). And yet, this is pre-
cisely the picture of the ICC that I wish to draw in this section. This picture, while 
not denying the status of the ICC as a legal institution, rejects the notion of a dichot-
omy between the “scales” of law and the “sword” of politics. Portraying the ICC as 
a political actor means to reject the idea of a binary opposition of law and politics 
and to accept that these discourses are “flip sides of the same coin” (Loughlin 2000, 
17). This intertwining of law and politics, in turn, expresses itself in two dimen-
sions: first, the ICC is an actor with its own political interests; as such, the ICC itself 
pursues political goals. Second, law, as the critical theorist Otto Kirchheimer argued 
(2015), is used “for political ends”; the ICC, therefore, is used as a tool to achieve 
certain political objectives. Let us look at both of these dimensions more closely.
Understanding the ICC as a political actor means, first, to accept that, like any 
other political actor, the ICC has its own interests and objectives. The main political 
interest of the Court is the elimination of its enemies, which the ICC stigmatizes as 
“hostes humani generis”—enemies of all mankind. As such, the ICC cannot escape 
what Schmitt (2007) has famously called “the political.” The political, as Schmitt 
pointed out, is the distinction between “friend” and “enemy,” which “denotes the 
utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation” 
(Schmitt 2007, 26). Importantly, conflicts with “the enemy” can never be decided by 
a “disinterested and therefore neutral … party” (Schmitt 2007, 27). The ICC can-
not escape the political because its judicial interventions are inevitably based on the 
decision of whom to prosecute—who is “the enemy”—and whom to spare—who 
is “the friend.” To say it slightly differently, the ICC purports to prosecute hostes 
humani generis; but the Court must still render a not always self-evident decision as 
to whom it stigmatizes as such an “enemy of all mankind” in a particular conflict. 
In intervening in a particular conflict, the ICC ineluctably must make a distinction 
between “friends” and “enemies,” and it is illusory to think that the Court is able 
to make this decision as a disinterested or neutral party. This view is confirmed by 
Sarah Nouwen and Werner Wouter: “The political” they observe “is not something 
external to the Court, not just a force which potentially compromises the independ-
ence of the Court and needs to be overcome … [for] … the ICC does not replace 
politics but enacts them” (2010, 943). The ICC’s reliance on a Schmittian concept 
of the political, Nouwen and Wouter demonstrate, became particularly apparent in 
the case of Uganda, where the ICC branded the Lord’s Resistance Army as “the 
enemy” and thereby legitimated Uganda’s government simultaneously. Their case 
study leads them to the following conclusion (2010, 962):
6 To be clear, I do not argue that the ICC is not a “legal institution”; my argument is that the ICC is, in 
fact, both a legal institution and a political actor.
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The ICC provides a vocabulary with which opponents can label the enemy 
as violators of universal norms, and thereby as the enemy of humanity itself. 
Adjudicating on genocide, war crimes and, most notably, crimes ‘against 
humanity’, the Court brands some as enemies of mankind ….
Obviously, then, an important consequence of the ICC’s nature as a political actor 
is that its interventions often have a major effect on “conflict narratives” insofar as 
they stigmatize some conflict parties as hostes humani generis while legitimizing 
others. As Mark Kersten demonstrates, such a conflict narrative was also generated 
in Libya in 2011, when the ICC selected Muammar Gaddafi as an enemy of all man-
kind, legitimized the opposition forces and thereby contributed significantly to the 
eventual toppling of Gaddafi (Kersten 2016, 118–125). Hence, while the ICC might 
be a legal institution acting according to prearranged rules, it is also a political actor 
with an interest in combatting its enemies. Viewed from this perspective, ICC tri-
als must be understood as “political trials” in the way Kirchheimer defined them: 
“elimination[s] of a political enemy … according to some prearranged rules” (2015, 
6). At this point, however, we must note a second political interest of the ICC: the 
interest in being regarded as a legitimate actor. Legitimacy is helpfully defined by 
Ian Hurd as “an actor’s normative belief that an … institution ought to be obeyed” 
(2007, 7). As a form of normative authority, legitimacy is of crucial importance for 
the ICC because the Court’s lack of enforcement capabilities often makes it reliant 
on the cooperation of states (e.g., to enforce arrest warrants). Thus, the ICC’s pri-
mary political interest of eliminating its enemies hinges to a considerable degree on 
its ability to appear to be a legitimate actor. It is widely accepted that an important 
source of the Court’s legitimacy is the fairness of its trials (Luban 2010; McDermott 
2016): the ICC must, therefore, make sure that its trials are not conducted as “show-
trials.” While it is inevitable and legitimate that the ICC combats enemies, the Court 
does not and must not destroy foes. For that reason, it is vital that even “enemies” are 
granted fundamental due process rights, most importantly, that their guilt or inno-
cence is determined in a fair trial. Judge Jackson was surely right when he warned 
in his opening statement of the Nuremberg trials that “to pass these defendants a 
poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well” (1945). For if international criminal 
law is itself regarded as a “poisoned chalice” that rides roughshod over the most fun-
damental due process rights, the ICC’s legitimacy suffers—and deservedly so. Thus, 
it is indeed in the ICC’s interest to bolster its legitimacy through the conduct of fair 
trials that, in turn, enables the Court to combat its enemies.
The second dimension of the claim that the ICC is a political actor situates the 
Court within its broader political, ethical, and social environment. This dimension 
is also based on the notion that law and legal institutions should pursue “political 
ends”; however, it focuses not primarily on the ICC’s struggle against hostes hum-
ani generis, but portrays the Court as an actor—in some ways even as a tool—in a 
global political struggle against mass atrocities. Lawyers largely neglect this dimen-
sion. This is hardly surprising; after all, this dimension seems to deny law’s elevated 
position and to relegate law to a servant of political goals rather than seeing it as the 
master over politics. Nonetheless, this neglect is somewhat curious given the fact 
that the global struggle against mass atrocities has been given a prominent place in 
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the Rome Statute. For the Statute’s Preamble highlights the Court’s role in combat-
ting “unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,” atroci-
ties that threaten to shatter the “delicate mosaic” of humanity. This dimension of the 
ICC’s political nature, then, reveals the picture of a legal institution that is part of a 
broader political objective. Such an understanding of the role of law and legal insti-
tutions chimes with Judith Shklar’s account in her book Legalism (1986). Legalism 
attacks the idea that it is possible, let alone useful, to separate social life into distinct 
“spheres” (e.g., a “sphere of law,” a “sphere of politics,” a “sphere of morality,” etc.) 
that exist in isolation from each other. “Law is politics … but not every form of 
politics is legalistic,” Shklar writes in a central passage of the book (1986, 144). The 
first part of this quotation obviously denies the autonomy of law as a realm detached 
from politics; even legal institutions, such as the ICC, are ultimately tools to pursue 
broader political goals. The broader political goal Shklar has in mind is the creation 
of a social order based on what she calls a “barebones liberalism,” a minimalist form 
of liberalism committed only to the values of toleration and social diversity (1986, 
5). The equally important second part of the quotation confirms that politics can but 
does not necessarily have to be legalistic7; that is, in some situations, law will be an 
effective weapon to achieve broader political goals, and in other situations it will be 
an obstacle. It is of crucial importance, Shklar insists, to acknowledge that “law is 
a form of political action, among others, which occasionally is applicable and effec-
tive and often is not. It is not an answer to politics, neither is it isolated from politi-
cal purposes and struggles” (1986, 143). Shklar’s account, then, legitimizes the view 
that the ICC is a part of—or a tool in—a global political struggle against mass atroc-
ities. As such, the Court’s interventions are not to be judged against lofty and often 
vacuous ideals of justice (Megret 2015, 26–27), but must pursue concrete political 
and moral goals; ultimately, Shklar writes, “it is the political [and moral] result that 
counts” (1986, 145). Such an emphasis on the concrete consequences of the ICC’s 
actions means that, precisely because the Court’s interventions have far-reaching 
and serious ethical and political ramifications, prudential calculations must guide its 
actions. Thus, Shklar helps us to understand the importance of the ICC’s identity as 
a political actor; she helps us to realize the positive potential, but also forces us to 
acknowledge the limitations of the ICC in the struggle against mass atrocities. Law, 
according to Shklar, can be a particularly useful way to pursue political ends because 
of the legitimacy it lends to political action; Kirchheimer’s view of the strength of 
law is similar when he points out that judicial proceedings are the preferred means 
to achieve political ends because they “authenticate” political action (2015, 6). But 
neither Shklar nor Kirchheimer are blind to the limits of law; and contrary to many 
modern legalists they insist that if law becomes an obstacle to the achievement of 
political ends, other means must be employed. Law, according to this view, is a tool 
not a panacea precisely because it is “ultimately … the political [and moral] result 
that counts” (Shklar 1986: 145).
7 Shklar defines “legalism” as “the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule fol-
lowing, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules” (1986: 1).
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Having outlined these two political dimensions, two closely related questions 
must be addressed: first, what is the relationship between these two dimensions? 
And second, apart from arguably providing a more realistic picture of the Court, has 
an understanding of the ICC as a political actor the (constructive) potential to shed 
light on some of international criminal justice’s most complex problems?
It might be tempting to diagnose an unresolvable tension between the two dimen-
sions of the argument that the ICC is a political actor: the first dimension, after all, 
emphasizes the individual institutional interests of the ICC. From this perspective, 
the ICC is a legal institution pursuing its own political goals. The second dimen-
sion, in turn, emphasizes broader political interests and objectives; here the ICC 
itself becomes a tool to achieve political ends—and these broader political ends 
can be but are not necessarily congruent with the ICC’s narrower individual objec-
tives. These two dimensions, it might be argued, collide at the exact moment when 
the ICC’s individual interest in eliminating its enemies becomes an obstacle to 
the broader political goal of combatting mass atrocities; they clash when an ICC 
intervention would prolong and/or exacerbate bloody conflicts. Indeed, this line of 
reasoning closely resembles the vexing problem of the so-called “peace versus jus-
tice dilemma.”8 The “dilemma,” in short, is that efforts to pursue “justice” (in the 
form of prosecution and punishment) constitute a double-edged sword with regard 
to “peace”: while prosecution and punishment can be powerful tools to contain a 
conflict and facilitate the creation of a peaceful environment in some cases, judicial 
intervention can constitute a serious obstacle to the creation of peace and prolong 
and/or exacerbate grueling human rights violations in others; in the latter cases, we 
are thus faced with a “peace versus justice dilemma.” A recent book-length analysis 
arrives at the conclusion that the dilemma is, in fact, unresolvable (Kersten 2016, 
201), and, indeed, there seems to be some truth in that: for the fundamental problem 
at the heart of this controversy does indeed exist; sometimes the pursuit of “justice” 
can be detrimental to “peace,” and there is certainly no “magic formula” to conjure 
away this underlying problem of the dilemma. I would suggest, however, that the 
current framing of the underlying problem as a “peace versus justice dilemma” is 
extremely unhelpful as it perpetuates the view of an unresolvable conflict of interests 
at the heart of international criminal justice. This dichotomy is obviously presented 
as one between “justice” and “peace,” but also as one between “law” (justice is 
equated with law) and “politics” (politics is equated with peace). Hence, the “peace” 
versus “justice” framing leads to two mutually exclusive options: either justice or 
peace, either law or politics; and, most importantly, it is by no means clear how this 
dilemma should be resolved by the ICC in practice. This is precisely the point where 
the alternative understanding of the ICC as a political actor unfolds its constructive 
potential by clearly suggesting a solution of how the Court should decide in cases 
in which it is faced with such a (seemingly) tragic choice. Its constructive potential 
is that it allows us to see that the two political dimensions are by no means as dia-
metrically opposed as it might appear and that the choice the ICC faces in these 
hard cases is less tragic than it might seem. The key to arriving at this important 
8 See also the discussion and citations above.
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insight is to understand that, by framing the underlying problem as a political rather 
than a metaphysical (i.e., a dilemma between “peace” and “justice”) conundrum, the 
problem is brought back to the sphere where it can be addressed more effectively: 
to the realm of politics, or, more precisely, the realm of political action and its con-
sequences. This shift, in turn, helps us to understand and accept that the ultimate 
justification for ICC action is to be found in the concrete political and moral conse-
quences it generates. Just as Shklar demands in Legalism, then, the concrete political 
and moral consequences become the yardstick against which ICC action is to be 
measured; and this perspective, as we shall see, reveals that the tension between the 
two political dimensions constitutes by no means an irresolvable dilemma.
What, then, are the potential moral and political consequences of ICC interven-
tion? Here we must distinguish between long-term and short-term consequences. It 
is often argued that the effects of the ICC should be measured on a long-term scale. 
Bruce Broomhall, for example, writes that the ICC can contribute to the develop-
ment of a “deeply rooted culture of accountability” (2004, 3; see also Akhavan 
2013). The effects of ICC intervention, in other words, are projected into the future 
where—so it is hoped—a culture of accountability will create a world less plagued 
by the evil of mass atrocities. Such a long-term perspective is in alignment with the 
statements made by ICC officials: as we have seen, Moreno Ocampo and Bensouda 
have repeatedly argued that “political considerations,” understood here as the short-
term effects of ICC intervention, are irrelevant for the strictly apolitical Court. The 
underlying logic of this argument is that any appearance of “being political” might 
seriously undermine the ICC’s legitimacy and threaten its long-term mission of 
creating a culture of accountability for mass atrocities. The short-term perspective, 
on the other hand, focuses on the immediate effects of ICC interventions on a par-
ticular —especially an ongoing—conflict. This, apparently, leads to a problem that 
should be familiar by now: ICC interventions can prolong/exacerbate ongoing con-
flicts and generate—in the short run—more human suffering than non-intervention. 
From a long-term perspective, however, intervention would (probably) help to create 
a future world in which evil rears its ugly head less frequently; non-intervention, in 
turn, would have positive short-term effects (compared to intervention) but would 
have detrimental consequences in the long run. So, have we arrived at the aporia 
of the “peace versus justice dilemma” again? No, we have not. This apparent clash 
between the long-term and the short-term consequences of ICC intervention (or 
non-intervention) poses by no means an irresolvable dilemma for the Court’s inter-
ests for the simple reason that negative short-term effects would have devastating 
consequences for the ICC’s legitimacy and effectiveness. For being regarded as a 
blind pursuer of “justice whatever the cost” would ineluctably trigger skepticism as 
to whether the ICC is a positive force in the world or if the Court is, in fact, a highly 
dangerous catalyst for human rights violations and suffering. Such skepticism would 
certainly plunge the ICC into an existential crisis and potentially sound the death 
knell for this legal institution. Let me be clear, however: the argument here is not 
that long-term effects of the ICC are irrelevant; the argument is, rather, that, in cases 
in which a clash between long-term and short-term effects of intervention becomes 
apparent, it is in the ICC’s individual interest to prioritize the latter. This insight, 
to be sure, does not conjure away the very real problem that sometimes the ICC’s 
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interest to prosecute and punish might indeed be at odds with the broader interest 
in combatting mass atrocities; but this framing of the problem demonstrates that in 
such cases it is in the ICC’s predominant interest to refrain from prosecution and 
punishment. Thus, the ICC’s individual interest cannot be isolated from the broader 
political interest in combatting mass atrocities as the perception of the ICC as an 
obstacle in the struggle against massive human rights violations would ultimately be 
detrimental to the legitimacy of the Court and threaten its very existence.
Thus, although the ICC pretends not to be interested in “political questions,” 
it must take political considerations into account. Prudential political action is a 
crucial source of the Court’s legitimacy and ultimately the most viable strategy to 
ensure the ICC’s survival as a legal institution and a political actor.
4  The Disavowal of Politics as a Noble Lie
Despite the conclusion I have reached in the previous section, many advocates of the 
ICC adamantly insist on the strictly apolitical nature of the Court. Their insistence 
leads to two questions: how do these commentators defend the idea of an apolitical 
ICC? And, even more importantly, why do they do so?
To start with the first question, defenders of the idea of an apolitical ICC argue 
that the ICC already exists as an independent legal institution. While they do not 
necessarily turn a blind eye to the issue of “politicization” (Heyder 2006; Dicker 
and Stevenson 2013; Onishi 2015; Woolaver and Palmer 2017), they point to the 
pivotal role of the politically independent OTP that selects the cases to be investi-
gated and the individuals to be prosecuted (Danner 2003; Bensouda 2012; Schef-
fer 2015). And the prosecutor, as Moreno Ocampo and Bensouda have repeatedly 
stressed, acts beyond the poisonous influence of politics and strictly in pursuit of 
legal justice. And, from a normative perspective, these authors argue that this is, of 
course, precisely how it should be: it is imperative for the ICC as a central institution 
of global justice to be objective, fair, and predictable—justice, after all, is a matter 
of fairness (Rawls 1985). There is, however, a compelling counterargument to this 
narrative: while it is certainly true that the OTP is politically independent from other 
actors, the prosecutor9 herself does not act exclusively according to legal principles. 
The Rome Statute vests the prosecutor with a considerable degree of “prosecuto-
rial discretion,” and this discretion is almost by definition not subject to rigid, pre-
determined rules (Greenawalt 2007; Lepard 2010; Davis 2015). As Benjamin Schiff 
observes (2015, 160):
The ICC … is formally a non-political organization. The scrutiny of the ICC 
should be triggered when crimes under its Statute appear to be taking place 
regardless of a separate international determination of the state’s legitimacy. 
Unfortunately, the Prosecutor often has to make political and pragmatic deci-
9 The OTP is the independent organ of the ICC, the person of the prosecutor heads this organ (see Arti-
cle 42 Rome Statute).
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sions rather than purely legalistic ones. The best the Court can do is to substi-
tute good political judgment for putatively non-political judgment in situation 
and case-selection and public pronouncements. The actions of the Prosecutor 
are key.
Schiff’s words reflect an interesting tension between his normative vision of the 
prosecutor (and the ICC) and his awareness of legal and political realities: Schiff 
wants the prosecutor to be “purely legalistic,” but he must conclude, albeit rather 
grudgingly, that “unfortunately the Prosecutor often has to make political and prag-
matic decisions.” This confession, then, leads us half way back to the claim I have 
developed in the previous section: the prosecutor does not exercise her prosecutorial 
discretion in a political (and moral) vacuum. But, of course, my argument has been 
more radical than Schiff’s: for I have contended that political and pragmatic deci-
sions are not merely the unfortunate tribute the prosecutor must pay to the harsh 
realities of international political life, but, in fact, normatively desirable judgments 
to ensure the future existence of the ICC as a legal institution and a political actor.
This brings us to a crucial question: what explanation does the non-traditional 
camp have for the ICC’s continued disavowal of politics? The answer is: most of 
these scholars do not address this question at all; and, if they do, they tend to provide 
a rather simplistic explanation for the disavowal of politics. Most advocates of the 
“traditional camp” (including the prosecutors), so their argument goes, are “legal-
ists” with scant interest in and understanding of international politics. Their sole 
focus is on lofty rules and norms of international law, and their main desire is to 
salvage the autonomy of international law from the poisonous influence of politics. 
This utopianism, according to the non-traditional camp, constitutes a serious obsta-
cle to developing a more realistic understanding of the ICC and, ultimately, also an 
obstacle to the Court’s effectiveness in practice. Joseph Hoover, for instance, insists 
that “the agonistic character … of international criminal law suggests that the law 
never escapes politics … Politics … is central to the court’s actions” (2014, 267). He 
continues that “the ICC’s disavowal of politics is potentially limiting” (2014, 281) 
since “failing to embrace the political role of the ICC is damaging to this impor-
tant institution because disavowing politics lends itself to naivety and a lack of self-
criticism” (2014, 267). In a similar vein, Nouwen and Wouter argue that “defining 
away the ICC’s political dimensions eventually undermines the Court by making it 
look either hypocritical or utopian” (2010, 946). Also, William Schabas, assessing 
the prosecutor’s strategy in selecting cases and targeting individuals, takes the same 
line: “They [the prosecutors and members of the traditional camp] have undoubtedly 
convinced themselves that they have found a legalistic formula enabling themselves 
to do the impossible, namely, to take a political decision while making it look judi-
cial” (2014, 89). The gist of these critiques, then, is that mantra-like asseverations 
portraying the ICC as an apolitical institution are mere expressions of a legalistic 
blindness to political realities or naïve attempts to save law’s purity from the con-
taminating influence of politics. I posit, however, that there could be10 a much more 
10 I address the problem of “proving” this argument in the Conclusion.
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interesting aspect to these asseverations. I propose that ICC officials, most impor-
tantly the prosecutor, must officially renounce politics to avoid highly dangerous, 
even perverse, consequences. That is to say, it is of vital importance for the ICC to 
create and uphold the noble lie of an apolitical Court, the illusion of an institution 
determined to follow uncompromisingly the letter of the law, and to pursue justice 
whatever the cost. In the remainder of this section, I will probe three potential argu-
ments for why the adoption of the noble lie is such a vital strategy: legitimacy, deter-
rence, and what I shall call “perverse incentive.”
The problem of legitimacy is one of the standard explanations for why the ICC 
must (allegedly) stay the hands of politics (Danner 2003; Fichtelberg 2006; Murphy 
2009; Takemura 2012; Tiemessen 2014). As I have pointed out above, legitimacy is 
of crucial importance for the ICC: the Court depends on the cooperation and sup-
port of states (financially, enforcement of arrest warrants, etc.) and it is, therefore, 
in the ICC’s interest to be regarded as an authority that ought to be obeyed. It is cer-
tainly true, then, that a lack of legitimacy would jeopardize the entire project of the 
ICC. The more complex question, though, is where legitimacy comes from. What is 
the source of legitimacy? The “traditional camp,” of course, has a straightforward 
answer to this question: the ICC’s source of legitimacy, they claim, is its apolitical 
nature that stands as a bulwark of justice in an unjust world tainted by politics. Obvi-
ously, this account rests on a juxtaposition of law and politics: law is portrayed as 
neutral, objective, fair, and thus legitimate; politics, in turn, is portrayed as biased, 
subjective, unfair, and thus illegitimate (Hansen 2014, 5).
Undoubtedly, the perception that the ICC is “political” can to a certain extent 
compromise the Court’s legitimacy. It might, for instance, motivate some states, fac-
ing the threat of ICC action, to play the “withdrawal card” and accuse the ICC of 
being politicized and pursuing selective justice. This, after all, is precisely what hap-
pened in 2016 when Burundi, Gambia, and South Africa announced their withdraw-
als (Allison 2016). However, it is also important to note that the traditional camp’s 
account of the source of legitimacy is extremely narrow: it completely neglects the 
fact, for example, that the (external) politicization of the ICC through the UN Secu-
rity Council is also a source of legitimacy and effectiveness for the Court. The UN 
Security Council, by referring a situation to the ICC (Article 13b Rome Statute), 
signals that the world’s major powers support action taken by the Court and thereby 
confers its own legitimacy on the Court. Moreover, Article 13b expands the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC and thus enhances the Court’s effectiveness in prosecuting some of 
the worst evildoers; this, ultimately, also enhances the ICC’s legitimacy. The ICC’s 
legitimacy, then, is not only created by legal neutrality but also by practical effec-
tiveness. As Steven Roach rightly observes: “Only in a perfect and non-conflictual 
world can we expect the ICC’s legal impartiality to provide the exclusive source 
of its legitimacy” (2006, 9). In an imperfect and highly conflictual international 
environment, however, the relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness can-
not be understood as a “one-way street”: surely, legitimacy is an important ingre-
dient for an international actor’s effectiveness (Franck 1990; Clark 2007); at the 
same time, though, the very effectiveness of an actor also creates legitimacy—it pro-
duces what Georg Jellinek has long ago called the “normative power of the factual” 
(1929, 332–79) and is, therefore, a source of legitimacy. A second objection to the 
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traditional camp’s legitimacy argument can be derived from the fact that the ICC 
has been constructed as a Court of “last resort” (Mendes 2011). The “doctrine of 
complementarity” establishes the ICC as an organ subsidiary to national jurisdic-
tions that steps in only when national Courts fail to discharge their duties (Article 17 
Rome Statute). Hence, the severity of the accusation that the ICC pursues selective 
justice—however justified it might be—is to a considerable degree defused by the 
fact that the state has failed to take action against the perpetrators of mass atroci-
ties in the first place. Hence, if we follow Thomas Franck (1990, 40) in character-
izing legitimacy in international politics as the “desire to be a member of the club, 
to benefit by the status of membership,” we can see that states forfeit the “benefit” 
of launching serious critique on the injustices of the international society if they 
isolate themselves by violating the most basic rules of legitimate state action. These 
arguments suggest that “politics” is a less severe problem for the legitimacy of the 
ICC than the traditionalists claim. The attempt to defend the legitimacy of the ICC 
can thus be one, but by no means the most important, reason for the adoption of the 
noble lie.
A second potential explanation for the necessity of the noble lie is that it fosters 
the ICC’s potential to deter future crimes. It is widely accepted that a central aim 
of criminal tribunals—domestic and international—is to prevent the perpetration 
of future criminal acts (Honderich 2005; Duff 2009; Brooks 2012, 35–50). Accord-
ingly, it is one of the explicit goals of the ICC “to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes [mass atrocities] and thus to contribute to the preven-
tion of such crimes.” The ICC, as stated earlier, should thus contribute to a “culture 
of accountability” in which potential perpetrators of mass atrocities face a credible 
threat of prosecution and punishment. For most members of the traditionalist camp, 
there is a direct correlation between the ICC’s apolitical nature and its potential to 
deter future crimes. The rationale behind their argument is that the ICC must prose-
cute and punish perpetrators without taking into account political considerations; the 
only criterion for the ICC should be the occurrence of mass atrocities, and its only 
aim should be to bring the perpetrators—indeed, all perpetrators—of these crimes 
to justice. Politics is still the bête noire, but in this context it takes on the specific 
form of “selectivity” (Cryer 2011; deGuzman 2012).11 Selectivity, so this argument 
goes, destroys the necessary illusion that each and every perpetrator is punished and 
thus seriously compromises the ICC’s deterrence capabilities (Paternosterer 1987; 
Mullins and Rothe 2010; Chazal 2015, 26). Now, the previous section has demon-
strated that the pursuit of justice whatever the cost would, in fact, run counter to the 
ICC’s individual interests and potentially sound the death knell for this institution. 
The question here, however, is whether the deterrence argument can be regarded as 
the main reason for the adoption of the noble lie, that is, for upholding the neces-
sary illusion of the consistent prosecution of every single perpetrator. In addressing 
this problem, we must note that the concept of deterrence is more complex than the 
standard narrative suggests. To begin with, no legal system can ever achieve perfect 
consistency and completely avoid selectivity; this is, of course, especially true for 
11 Of course, “selectivity” is often seen as a threat to the ICC’s legitimacy as well.
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international criminal law with its limited capacities to prosecute and punish (Cryer 
2011). Confronted with this obvious problem, Moreno Ocampo has developed the 
metaphor of the “long shadow” of the ICC. That is, the long shadow cast by the 
ICC should motivate individual states to take effective action against perpetrators. 
According to Moreno Ocampo (2010), it is “the absence of trials by the ICC” that 
must be the ultimate goal of the ICC because this would mean that mass atrocities 
are effectively prosecuted at the domestic level. There is, in my opinion, a lot to 
be said for this approach; yet it cannot solve the most fundamental conundrum sur-
rounding the question of deterrence: do (potential) perpetrators of mass atrocities 
make the rational means-ends calculations that are central to any theory of deter-
rence (Stahn 2010, 5)? Many authors are skeptical. David Wippman, for instance, 
writes (1999, 479):
When the various motivations for attacks on civilians are combined … it is not 
surprising that a light risk of future prosecution will not have a major deterrent 
effect. Indeed, in a war of this type, it may be that even a significant risk of 
future prosecution will have relatively little impact.
In a similar vein, Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu believes that “using international war 
crimes trials as a frontline approach to preventing or deterring genocide is a fail-
ing policy … [because] … Courts … are inherently reactive” (2008, 178). To be 
clear, I do not necessarily agree with these rather pessimistic statements; nor do I 
disagree with them. Rather, my take on the question of whether the ICC can deter 
future atrocities must remain agnostic because the literature—from both theoretical 
and empirical perspectives—does by no means yield a clear answer to this question 
(Wippman 1999; Akhavan 2001; Chung 2008; Vinjamuri 2010; Bosco 2011; Buite-
laar 2016; Hillebrecht 2016; Dancy 2017). And how could it be otherwise? After all, 
it is one of the characteristics of the concept of deterrence that it is almost impossi-
ble to measure and thus open to different interpretations. As Schabas notes: “Deter-
rence remains somewhat of an enigma … [because] … while we can readily point to 
those who are not deterred, it is nearly impossible to identify those who are” (2011, 
61). In light of this “enigma,” I conclude that, while the deterrence argument might 
at least be part of the explanation for the necessity of the noble lie, it cannot entirely 
explain the ICC’s disavowal of politics.
The third argument that can be made for the adoption of the noble lie derives 
from the insight that ICC interventions might not only fail to have a deterrent effect 
on perpetrators but might, in fact, provide perverse incentives to commit further 
atrocities.12 Let me elaborate this “problem of perverse incentive” by briefly return-
ing to the previous section where I have demonstrated that it is in the political inter-
est of the Court to act as a prudent decision-maker. A crucial factor to be taken into 
consideration is whether ICC intervention would exacerbate or prolong conflicts. If 
12 The concept of “perverse incentive” is used in various disciplines, most frequently, probably, in eco-
nomics. It denotes a theory/system/institution/etc. that was created to produce specific behavioral incen-
tives but, in actual fact, produces unintended incentives that are often contrary to the intended incentive 
of the creators of the theory/system/institution/etc.
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the answer to this question is in the affirmative, I have argued, it is in the ICC’s 
own interests to refrain from intervention.13 However, the logical consequence of 
this anti-legalistic account of the ICC is that it creates incentives to commit further 
crimes or, at least, incentives to threaten the perpetration of further crimes. For, if 
the ICC openly admitted that questions of peace and security are part (and parcel) of 
the decision of whether to intervene, it would become all too easy for perpetrators to 
evade prosecution simply by threatening to commit further atrocities. The effects of 
such an acknowledgment would indeed be perverse: it would send a signal to perpe-
trators that a promising strategy to evade prosecution is the threat or actual perpetra-
tion of further atrocities. It is, I think, rather curious that so few scholars of interna-
tional criminal justice have problematized this point. One of the very few who have 
at least broached this issue is Michael Struett, who sees clearly that:
if political leaders who are guilty of serious international law crimes know 
that they will be treated more leniently if they can threaten more victims, 
and thereby trade the protection of those would-be victims for some form of 
amnesty or judicial leniency, then they will have every incentive to increase 
their commission of serious international law crimes. (2012, 84)
Struett, therefore, recognizes that ICC interventions can provide perverse incentives 
to increase the commission of mass atrocities and links this problem to the Court’s 
appearance as a political actor. This, ultimately, allows us to see the predicament the 
ICC faces with striking clarity: the Court cannot act as a politically blind pursuer of 
justice because such an unyielding strategy would sooner rather than later sound the 
death knell for the ICC; simultaneously, any acknowledgment of the Court to take 
political considerations into account could easily turn the ICC into a catalyst for 
grueling human rights violations and seriously undermine its legitimacy. The only 
way out of this predicament is to become a prudent political actor and, at the same 
time, to disavow politics; the only solution to the ICC’s predicament, in other words, 
is to continuously repeat the noble lie and thereby create and uphold the illusion of 
a strictly apolitical Court. Thus the ICC’s disavowal of politics becomes in itself a 
deeply political act; for the noble lie is, in fact, nothing else than a prudential strat-
egy to avoid perverse moral and political consequences and to prevent the ICC from 
digging its own grave. The ICC’s disavowal of politics, then, becomes a testament to 
its nature as a prudent political actor. The irony of all this is obvious: the non-tradi-
tional camp attempts to develop a more realistic and more sophisticated understand-
ing of the ICC by revealing its “political” or “politicized” nature. For these scholars, 
the ICC’s disavowal of politics is simply the consequence of blind legalism, a lack 
of understanding of and interest in politics. In fact, however, it might well be that 
some of those who are discounted as politically blind legalists have understood the 
game of politics much better than most members of the non-traditional camp.
13 This, of course, does not rule out intervention and prosecution in the future.
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5  Closing Remarks
The ICC’s former Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, has recently stated that in 
his role he must make decisions “on problems that no national or international 
prosecutor had ever faced” (2015, 4). His most daunting challenge, he continues, 
was to identify the situations and select the cases that should be presented before 
the Court (2015, 4). The present article chimes with Moreno Ocampo’s assess-
ment. It argues that the challenges for the prosecutor, and by extension for the 
ICC, are indeed daunting and unique. However, it frames the fundamental pre-
dicament of the Court in very different terms: the ICC’s most difficult challenge, 
I assert, is to act as a prudent political actor on the one hand, but to uphold the 
noble lie of a strictly apolitical, even anti-political, Court on the other. Indeed, the 
central thesis of this article is that the future of the ICC as a legal institution and 
a political actor will depend greatly on how well the Court manages to walk this 
tightrope.
It is not too difficult to anticipate two potential objections to this thesis. First, 
some commentators might question the idea of the noble lie and demand empiri-
cal evidence to corroborate the hypothesis. But, of course, it lies in the very 
nature of the idea of the noble lie that it cannot be directly proven. My response to 
this objection, however, is that there is little empirical evidence that the ICC has 
hitherto acted as a politically blind pursuer of legal justice; in fact, as Courtney 
Hillebrecht’s empirical study concludes, “the Court does not enter into investiga-
tions or indictments lightly (2016, 616). And David Bosco confirms that “there 
is strong evidence that the Court has trodden very carefully [especially] in areas 
where major powers have strong interests” (2012). In turn, the most “concrete 
evidence” for the ICC’s nature as an a(nti-)political institution is provided by the 
statements of its prosecutors insisting that they carry out their duties in complete 
isolation from political considerations. Schabas thinks he reveals an important 
truth when he writes (2014, 89): “They have undoubtedly convinced themselves 
that they have found a legalistic formula enabling themselves to do the impos-
sible, namely, to take a political decision while making it look judicial.” What 
he—along with numerous members of the non-traditional camp—does not seem 
to realize, however, is that the prosecutors do not try to convince “themselves” of 
the apolitical nature of their actions; what they try, rather, is to create and uphold 
the necessary illusion of an apolitical Court to avoid perverse moral and political 
consequences. Their adoption of the noble lie is a pragmatic strategy—an expres-
sion of prudent politics rather than blind legalism.
Second, it might be argued that the purpose of this article is self-defeating. 
For, if the thesis of the noble lie is correct, it is all the more important not to 
destroy this valuable illusion—not even through an academic article. This objec-
tion, though, is of a purely theoretical nature. My aim, as I have stated in the 
Introduction, is to bring into clearer focus some of the vexed conundrums the ICC 
faces and the role the Court can and should play in world politics. What I have 
hopefully demonstrated is that the ICC is a political actor that must—precisely 
because it is a political actor—disavow politics. But, surely, to worry that this 
1 3
Criminal Law, Philosophy 
attempt to develop a better understanding of the ICC exposes the noble lie and 
could backfire in practice would be based on the somewhat far-fetched assump-
tion that perpetrators of mass atrocities—the group of human beings who must 
be deceived by the noble lie—are interested in the academic literature on inter-
national criminal justice and will capitalize on its insights. While such worries 
would overstate the potential reach of academic literature, the intended audience 
of this article—those who want to understand the ICC’s nature as a legal institu-
tion and a political actor and its role in world politics—can, or so I hope, benefit 
from its insights.
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